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POWERS
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JED RUBENFELD††
In this Dialogue, constitutional pundits Confident and Doubtful
debate the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. They wrangle about the appli-
cation of the Article I, § 7 process to the Act, the relevance of the leg-
islative bargaining process to its constitutionality, and the merits of
formalism and functionalism. As Confident becomes No-Longer-So-
Confident, Doubtful proposes a way to reconcile the seemingly irrec-
oncilable “formalist” and “functionalist” Supreme Court decisions.
Marshalling the constitutional text for support, Doubtful argues that
the Court should take a checks and balances approach to congres-
sional delegations of power to the executive, while maintaining a rig-
orous separation of powers review of Article I powers.
At the time of the writing of this Dialogue, the Line Item Veto Act
was, as the prologue indicates, awaiting a pronouncement from the
Supreme Court. In Clinton v. City of New York,1 the Act was invali-
dated. However, the Dialogue stands not only as a strong dissent to
the majority’s opinion in that case, but as a powerful argument for a
new conception of formalism and functionalism.
INTRODUCTION
The Line Item Veto Act2 is once again on its way to the Supreme
Court of the United States. Federal district judges have twice con-
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1. 118 S.Ct. 2091(1998).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 691, 691a–691f, 692
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cluded that the Act violates the Constitution’s division of authority
between Congress and the President.3 The Supreme Court dismissed
the first case for lack of standing.4 Assuming that the Court reaches
the merits in the present case, Clinton v. City of New York,5 we sus-
pect most observers find little reason to doubt that the Court will
hold the Act unconstitutional.6
Isn’t that obviously the correct decision? The Line Item Veto
Act certainly looks unconstitutional, because it seems to derogate so
palpably from the Article I, Section 7 lawmaking process and because
the Act seems to make the President a lawmaker. But what looks un-
constitutional may not be unconstitutional. A careful analysis of the
Section 7 and separation of powers issues suggests that the Line Item
Veto Act—either as written or with minor modifications—is not un-
constitutional after all. Perhaps the confident critic of the Act would
(Supp. II 1996)). [This Act was invalidated by the Supreme Court after the completion of this
Dialogue. See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S.Ct. 2091(1998)—Eds.]
3. See Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1997), appeal dismissed sub nom. Raines
v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997); City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C.), appeal
docketed sub nom. Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 1123 (1998). The Act vests jurisdic-
tion over challenges to its constitutionality in the District of Columbia court and provides for
direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any decision on that issue. See 2 U.S.C. § 692 (Supp.
II 1996).
4. See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317 (1997). In Raines, six Members of Congress
who had voted against the Act brought suit, alleging that the Act “unconstitutionally expands
the President’s power.” Id. at 2315-16. The Act specifically provides that “[a]ny Member of
Congress or any individual adversely affected by [the Act] may bring an action . . . on the
ground that any provision of . . . this part violates the Constitution.” 2 U.S.C. § 692(a)(1) (Supp.
II 1996). The Court, however, ruled that the plaintiffs had “alleged no injury to themselves as
individuals” and that “the institutional injury they allege is wholly abstract and widely dis-
persed.” Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2322. In a concurring opinion, Justices Souter and Ginsburg ex-
pressly stated their view that private plaintiffs who would have benefited from provisions can-
celled under the Act would “likely . . . have standing under Article III.” Id. at 2325 (Souter, J.,
concurring). Justices Stevens and Breyer thought that the Raines plaintiffs had standing. See id.
at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2329 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5. Appeal docketed, 118 S. Ct. 1123 (1998).
6. One member of the Court appears already to have concluded that the Act is unconsti-
tutional. See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Given the fact that the
authority at stake is granted by the plain and unambiguous text of Article 5, it is equally clear
to me that the statutory attempt to eliminate it is invalid.”). On one ground or another, many
commentators agree. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Bottom Line on the Line-Item Veto Act
of 1996, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233 (1997) (arguing that the Act is unconstitutional be-
cause it redefines the constitutional term “bill,” alters the balance of powers, and violates the
delegation doctrine); Lawrence Lessig, Lessons from a Line Item Veto Law, 47 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1659, 1661-63 (1997) (arguing that the Act is unconstitutional because it violates the
delegation doctrine); Michael B. Rappaport, Veto Burdens and the Line Item Veto Act, 91 NW.
U. L. REV. 771, 772-73 (1997) (arguing that the Act is unconstitutional because it burdens the
President’s veto power).
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do well to carefully consider the arguments of the Act’s doubtful de-
fender.
Confident: Let’s get one thing straight at the beginning: the Supreme
Court has held that “[t]he fact that a given law or procedure is effi-
cient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government,
standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”7
So no arguments based on the supposed need for this monstrosity.
Doubtful: You won’t hear any from me. To tell you the truth, I have
no idea whether the Act is good or bad policy. For all I know, it may
lessen the already too weak political constraints on congressional
pork-barreling. But I quite agree: let’s confine ourselves to constitu-
tional arguments.
Confident: In that case there can be no doubt. A President may not
pick and choose which provisions of a bill presented to him by Con-
gress will be the law of the land. The Line Item Veto Act empowers
the President to sit as a censor of legislative actions and to rewrite the
legislative bargains that Congress has struck. In effect, the President
becomes the nation’s chief lawmaker—which violates not only the
most basic principles of separation of powers, but also the clear dic-
tates of Article I, Section 7.
Doubtful: That certainly sounds unconstitutional.
Confident: I’ll tell you something else: the Act is indistinguishable as
a practical matter from a law authorizing the President to pencil out
provisions of a bill presented for his signature before signing it. And
everybody knows that would be unconstitutional.
Doubtful: You make me almost embarrassed to be doubtful. Will you
let me try to separate out the various arguments you’re making, so
that we can look at them one by one?
Confident: Certainly—although the arguments are highly interre-
lated.
7. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
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Doubtful: I can see that. Here’s what I propose. I always think it best
to start with the constitutional text, so let’s begin with your claim that
the Act violates Article I, Section 7. After that, we can discuss
whether the Act impermissibly allows the President to upset the leg-
islative bargains struck in Congress. Then, we’ll take up the idea that
the Act turns the President into a lawmaker, in violation of basic
separation of powers principles. And finally, we’ll return to your
point about the Act being functionally indistinguishable from a pre-
signature line item vetoact. Fair enough?
Confident: I’m confident.
I. ARTICLE I, SECTION 7
Doubtful: Tell me, then, exactly why the Line Item Veto Act violates
Article I, Section 7.8
Confident: With pleasure. Everyone knows that Section 7 gives the
President only two options when presented with a bill. “[B]e the bill
small or large, its concerns focused or diffuse, its form particular or
omnibus, the President must accept or reject the entire thing, swal-
lowing the bitter with the sweet.”9 In one of the modern Supreme
Court’s central separation of powers cases, the Chadha decision in-
validating the one-House legislative veto, the Court stated that “the
prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the
Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the Federal govern-
ment be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaus-
tively considered, procedure.”10
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If
he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that
House in which it originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Jour-
nal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that
House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to
the other House, by which it shall likewise be considered and if approved by two
thirds of that House, it shall become a Law.
9. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-13, at 265 (2d ed. 1988);
see also The President’s Veto Power, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 128, 128-69 (1988) (concluding
that neither text nor history nor analogy to judicial review supports the constitutionality of an
inherent line item veto power).
10. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
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The effect of the Line Item Veto Act—indeed the very aim of
the Act—is to alter this “single, finely wrought and exhaustively con-
sidered, procedure.” Under the Act, after the President has signed a
bill presented to him by Congress, he has five days to “cancel” certain
taxing and spending provisions upon his sole determination that such
cancellation will “reduce the Federal budget deficit” and do no harm
to “the national interest.”11 If Congress wants to reenact the canceled
provisions, both chambers must pass, by a majority vote, a
“disapproval bill,”12 which may itself be vetoed by the President, in
which case the canceled provisions can become law only if re-passed
by two-thirds votes in both the House and the Senate. The Act thus
profoundly alters the process of lawmaking specified in the Constitu-
tion, a process which Congress and the President have followed with-
out exception for 200 years.
The Act’s inconsistency with Chadha could not be clearer. In
fact, the line item veto flouts the Article I, Section 7 process in the
very same way that the legislative veto did. The legislative veto was
unconstitutional because it enabled a single House of Congress to
make law through a mechanism that did not conform to the Constitu-
tion’s requirements of bicameralism or presentment.13 In a parallel
fashion, the Line Item Veto Act is unconstitutional because it en-
ables the President to make law through a mechanism equally at odds
with bicameralism (in fact, neither House is involved in the Presi-
dent’s exercise of the veto) and with presentment (the President ex-
ercises the line item veto outside the time period prescribed by Sec-
tion 7 and in defiance of the all-or-nothing limitation on the
constitutional veto power). In short, the Act is a blatant attempt to
give the executive a second, retail role in the lawmaking process,
when the Constitution deliberately affords the President only one
wholesale shot at shaping the law.
11. 2 U.S.C. § 691(a)(A)(i)-(iii) (Supp. II 1996). The Act applies to “any dollar amount of
discretionary budget authority,” “any item of new direct spending,” and “any limited tax bene-
fit.” Id. § 691(a)(1)–(3).
12. Id. § 691d.
13. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956-58. In a subsequent memorandum decision, the Court
seemed to make clear that the holding of Chadha applies to two-House vetoes as well. See
United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (mem.), aff’g Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (striking down Section 21(a) of
the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, which provided that an FTC trade
regulation rule should become effective unless both Houses of Congress disapproved it). If any-
thing, this strengthens the argument that, under Chadha, federal lawmaking must follow pre-
cisely the procedures ordained by Article I, Section 7.
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Doubtful: I’m very nearly convinced. There’s just one doubt in my
mind: I’m not sure that Chadha applies.
Confident: Of course Chadha applies. We’re talking about Article I,
Section 7. Chadha is the leading case.
Doubtful: Yes, but as the Court acknowledged in that case, the first
step in the analysis is to “establish that the challenged action . . . is of
the kind to which the procedural requirements of Art. I, § 7 apply.”14
Now, the procedural requirements of Section 7 cannot apply in any
categorical way to action taken by executive branch officers, even if
the action is what you and I would probably call “lawmaking.” Actors
within the executive branch make law every day (for example, by en-
acting regulations) outside of the process set forth in Article I, Sec-
tion 7. Chadha itself expressly states that such “lawmaking” by execu-
tive officers need not satisfy the requirements of Section 7.15 So, even
if the President is engaged in “lawmaking” when he exercises the
cancellation power conferred on him by the Line Item Veto Act, why
would Chadha apply?
Confident: Because the Act directly intrudes upon the Section 7
process itself. The Act has nothing to do with run-of-the-mill execu-
tive branch lawmaking within the confines of statutorily delegated
authority. Instead, it directly intrudes upon the finely wrought consti-
tutional process through which Congress and the President make the
law of the land in the first place.
Doubtful: You sound very persuasive. But you are too quick for a
slow thinker like me. You agree, if I have it right, that Section 7 is not
violated every time Congress authorizes actors in the executive
branch to enact regulations that have the force of law?
Confident: Certainly I agree. I’m not suggesting that the Constitution
forbids properly constrained delegations of regulatory authority.
14. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
15. See id. at 953 n.16 (“Executive action under legislatively delegated authority that
might resemble ‘legislative’ action in some respects is not subject to the approval of both
Houses of Congress and the President for the reason that the Constitution does not so re-
quire.”).
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Doubtful: And you agree that when we speak here of “actors in the
executive branch,” we include the President himself? In other words,
if Congress authorized the President himself to render a decision that
would bring into effect a new rule of law, you would not say that Sec-
tion 7 had necessarily been violated?
Confident: No, within the broad limits of delegation doctrine, there
would be no particular constitutional problem in permitting the
President the rule making power often entrusted to inferior executive
officers.
Doubtful: All right. Then I think a great deal turns on the distinction
you draw between what you call “run-of-the-mill executive branch
lawmaking” and the “constitutional process through which Congress
and the President make the law of the land.” Do you mind if I ask
you one or two questions about this distinction?
Confident: Not a bit.
Doubtful: Well, it seems to me that an important feature of what you
call “run-of-the-mill executive branch lawmaking” is that it happens
after the Section 7 process has been complied with. Is that right?
Confident: Quite right.
Doubtful: So the crucial distinction is between presidential action
that forms part of the Section 7 process itself, and presidential action
that takes place only after law has already been properly made
through that process?
Confident: I believe that’s what I’ve said.
Doubtful: Good. Then let’s take the Line Item Veto Act step by step.
Under the system the Act establishes, the first thing that happens is
that a bill containing provisions subject to the Act is passed by a ma-
jority vote of both Houses and presented to the President for his sig-
nature. Is there any violation of Section 7 at this point?
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Confident: Of course not. The violation occurs when the President
vetoes particular provisions of the bill.
Doubtful: Perhaps. But you agree, then, that under the Act, the
President is constitutionally presented with a bill. If he vetoes the bill
in whole upon presentment, is there any constitutional problem?
Confident: Obviously not. The Act doesn’t purport to alter the con-
stitutional rules governing what happens to a properly vetoed bill. As
I said a moment ago, the constitutional violation occurs only when
the President signs the bill and then purports to veto particular provi-
sions in it.
Doubtful: I’m glad you think so, but I think I ought to tell you that
one scholar has found a constitutional problem just here.16 Under the
Act, a vetoed bill that was later made law by a two-thirds vote of the
House and Senate would apparently not be subject to the President’s
line item cancellation power. Therefore, this scholar argues, the Line
Item Veto Act imposes an unconstitutional “burden” on the Presi-
dent’s veto by taking away a power he would have had, just because
he vetoed a bill.17 Personally, I don’t find this “veto-burden” argu-
ment quite convincing, but unless you object, I will confine my re-
marks about this problem to a footnote.
Confident: Let me ask one question. If this “veto-burden” problem is
really a problem, could it be fully taken care of by a new Line Item
Veto Act of 1998, identical to the present one except that the new
Act would apply to all laws, whether passed with the President’s sig-
nature or over his veto?
Doubtful: Yes. The “veto-burden” problem does not go to the consti-
tutionality of the line item cancellation power itself.
Confident: Then I’m not interested in it.
16. See Rappaport, supra note 3, at 772-73.
17. See id.
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Doubtful: Footnote it is.18 To pick up our thread: let’s say, then, that
there is no constitutional problem if the President vetoes the entire
bill. Suppose now that he signs the bill. Is there a constitutional
problem at this point?
Confident: Has the President done a line item veto or not?
Doubtful: We don’t know yet. He has just signed the bill. The Act
gives him five days to exercise his cancellation power. But at the
moment he signs the bill, is there a constitutional violation?
Confident: Well I would have to say—actually, I’m not sure how to
answer that question.
Doubtful: Perhaps I can help. At the moment the President signs a
bill, is the bill law?
Confident: Yes, it certainly is. The Constitution says so. If the Presi-
dent signs a bill duly and properly presented to him, it becomes a
law.19
Doubtful: I think so too. So it seems fair to say that to this point the
Line Item Veto Act fully satisfies the requirements of Section 7. A
bill is passed by majority vote of both Houses; it is presented to the
President for his signature. If he vetoes the bill, it is returned to the
Congress for a potential supermajority bicameral override, but if he
signs the bill, the bill is law. Fair enough to this point?
18. The Act does not seem to “burden” a President’s veto power any more than plea bar-
gaining “burdens” a defendant’s right to a jury trial. The Act confers on the President a new
power if he signs certain bills into law, but puts him in no worse a position if he vetoes (just as a
plea offer confers on the defendant a benefit if he pleads guilty, but puts him in no worse a po-
sition if he goes to trial). A statute that read, “Whenever the President vetoes any bill, ten mil-
lion dollars will be subtracted from the funds available to the executive branch,” might be un-
constitutional as a “veto burden.” But the Line Item Veto Act is in no way a generalized
penalty on the veto power. It simply makes the President’s unilateral cancellation power inap-
plicable when Congress has passed the subject law over the President’s initial veto, a limitation
consistent with the basic structure of Article I, Section 7, because Congress can always achieve
any legislative results it wants (irrespective of the President’s views) by a two-thirds vote in fa-
vor of that result in both chambers.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
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Confident: I suppose.
Doubtful: You “suppose”?
Confident: Well, something is troubling me, but I’m not sure what.
Doubtful: Something’s troubling me, too, because if the Act doesn’t
disturb the Article I, Section 7 process up to the point where a bill
becomes law, then it’s hard to see how the subsequent cancellation
power that the Act vests in the President can be said to disrupt the
Section 7 process. You said yourself that the crucial distinction was
between presidential action that takes place after a bill has properly
become law under Section 7, and presidential action that is part of
the Section 7 process itself. But you agreed with me just now that the
bill becomes law upon the President’s signature, and at that moment
the Section 7 process is complete. The relevant precedent, therefore,
is not Chadha; it is the body of case law prescribing the rules that per-
tain to congressional delegations of what looks like legislative power
to the executive branch. And of course that body of case law imposes
very few limitations. In fact, if you like, I can cite you a long line of
cases upholding a presidential power to cancel or to suspend provi-
sions of extant law, and I can cite you an even longer line of statutes,
old and new, entrusting just such a power in the President. Care to
hear my authorities?20
Confident: No, thanks. I can now see even better than I could before
why the Act is unconstitutional, and it is a Section 7 problem, after
all. The Act violates the mandatory phrase “shall . . . become a Law.”
The Constitution says that a bill signed by the President “shall . . . be-
come a Law,” and you were just assuming that when he signs a bill, it
is law. But that’s not really true. Under the Act, a bill signed by the
President is law only if he chooses not to cancel any portion of it.
Every provision in a signed bill must become law upon the presiden-
tial signature, but the Act purports to give the President a way of
avoiding that constitutionally mandated result.
Doubtful: I’m pleased to have been of service. But I’m not sure why
you say that the Act allows the President to prevent a portion of the
20. See infra notes 30-43.
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bill from becoming law. Why isn’t it fair to say instead what I thought
we agreed on a moment ago—that the bill, in toto, becomes law at the
moment the President signs it, but that the Act permits the President
to cancel certain provisions of the law thereafter?
Confident: I’ll tell you why. Because Congress deliberately passed a
Line Item Veto Act. Because Congress expressly provided that the
President’s line item veto “prevents” the canceled provisions from
having “legal force or effect.”21 Because the canceled provisions
aren’t even to be entered into the United States Code. The very aim
of the Act is to allow the President to prevent the canceled provisions
—provisions that Congress has passed and that he has signed—from
ever becoming law.
Doubtful: You put the case well. However, the Act expressly pro-
vides that the President can exercise the cancellation power only af-
ter a bill is “signed into law.”22 So according to the actual language of
the Act, the President’s line item “veto” does not prevent the can-
celed provisions from ever becoming law. It rescinds them. It termi-
nates or nullifies the legal effect that they obtained when he signed
the bill into law.23
But more fundamentally, you can’t really mean that the constitu-
tionality of the Act turns on the nomenclature Congress used in de-
scribing the President’s cancellation power. For then even if you were
right, and even if this Act had to be struck down as unconstitutional,
it would follow that Congress could constitutionally pass a new line
item veto act tomorrow. The new act could be identical to the old in
every substantive respect, so long as it had a new name, expressly
stated that the signed bill shall be law, called for the publication of
the entire signed bill in the United States Code—and provided that
the President may nonetheless “terminate” (or “suspend”) certain of
the bill’s provisions through the designated cancellation process. Are
you prepared to concede that a new line item veto act, with those
cosmetic changes, would be constitutional?
Confident: I didn’t say that.
21. 2 U.S.C. § 691e(4)(B) (Supp. II 1996).
22. Id. § 691(a) (emphasis added).
23. See id. § 691b(a).
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Doubtful: Well, you must agree that if this Act is unconstitutional be-
cause of its name, and because of the business about the United
States Code, and because of the language about “prevent[ing]” the
canceled provisions from having legal effect, those problems could be
easily overcome?
Confident: I suppose so.
Doubtful: So would you object if I proceeded in this discussion by
putting aside such problems and by assuming that at the moment
when the President signs a bill, the bill becomes law?
Confident: I do object. Your new line item veto act, even with its new
name, and even without the offending language I mentioned before,
would still be unconstitutional.
Doubtful: But when I asked you how you knew that the Act pur-
ported to empower the President to prevent the canceled provisions
from ever becoming law, you defended your position by referring to
the name of the Act, the business about the U.S. Code, and so on.
Are you changing your answer?
Confident: I suppose I am not locked into an answer once I have
given it.
Doubtful: Certainly you are.
Confident: I am?
Doubtful: Yes. You lose and are now eliminated. However, like the
Line Item Veto Act, you can be revived with a new name and without
the offending language. All right?
No-Longer-So-Confident: Gee, I guess so. Where was I?
Doubtful: You were going to explain why the Act, even if it had a dif-
ferent name, and even if it stated more expressly than it does now
that a signed bill becomes law in toto upon the President’s signature,
would still be unconstitutional under Section 7.
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No-Longer-So-Confident: That’s right. There’s something wrong with
the whole idea of asking whether the bill “became law” at the mo-
ment the President signed it.
Doubtful: There is?
No-Longer-So-Confident: Yes, now that I think it over, the whole
question is meaningless. It’s transcendental nonsense.
Doubtful: I’m not sure what you mean.
No-Longer-So-Confident: It’s like asking about angels dancing on the
head of a pin.
Doubtful: If you say so. But in that case, you must withdraw your
constitutional objection to the Act.
No-Longer-So-Confident: What?
Doubtful: If there’s no meaningful answer to the question of whether
the signed bill is law, then you can’t object to the Act on the ground
that it stops the signed bill from becoming law. Perhaps you’ve for-
gotten, but it was that precise objection of yours that obliged us to try
to answer the question of whether the bill became law upon the
President’s signature. If you now say that the entire question is
meaningless, then of course you must also drop your claim that the
bill does not become law upon the President’s signature.
No-Longer-So-Confident: That’s not what I meant at all. I didn’t
mean that the whole question was meaningless.
Doubtful: I see. What did you mean?
No-Longer-So-Confident: I mean that your way of answering the
question is sheer formalism of the worst sort. A piece of paper
doesn’t “become law” just because the President signs it. If you look
at the Line Item Veto Act from a practical and pragmatic standpoint,
you immediately see that it is an addition to the lawmaking process,
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not a delegation of power to administer laws already made. Under
the Act, the President gets to decide that certain provisions of a
signed bill are to have no legal effect. No matter how you try to dance
around it, the bottom line is that the Act gives the President the
power to prevent provisions of a signed bill from becoming the law of
the land. Why, no one even knows what actual taxing or spending law
is going to govern the country until the President does or doesn’t ex-
ercise the cancellation power. The very point of Chadha was that the
Constitution ordains a procedure that brings the lawmaking process
to a close when the procedures of Section 7 have concluded.
Doubtful: You make some good points, but I don’t think I can agree
with your conclusions. In the first place, to call an argument in this
area formalistic is not necessarily to disparage it. Chadha itself may
embody a belief that the Constitution’s separation of powers rests in
part on a healthy formalism, or at least on an adherence to formal
processes when the Constitution ordains them.24 But leave that to one
side: you add nothing to the argument by labeling the line item veto
authority an “addition to the lawmaking process.” Any congressional
delegation of authority to the executive or to the judiciary to “fill in
the details” necessarily delays the moment at which one can be sure
what the full body of legal rules will be beyond the end of the Section
7 process. In every such case what “law is going to govern the coun-
try” is uncertain until the officers with delegated authority act. Un-
less there is some basis for distinguishing the Line Item Veto Act
from other statutes with this effect, a decision that the Act is uncon-
stitutional would put in question the entire administrative state.
No-Longer-So-Confident: But there is a basis for distinguishing the
Act. When executive or judicial officers fill in the interstices of en-
acted law, the enacted law remains the law. The Line Item Veto Act
gives the President power to stop the relevant provisions from ever
becoming law—and I mean from ever really becoming law, from
taking real legal effect in the real world.
24. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983) (“Explicit and unambiguous provisions
of the Constitution prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Ex-
ecutive in the legislative process. . . . These provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the consti-
tutional design for the separation of powers.”).
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Doubtful: Let’s think about that. On your view, any statute which
creates a conditional rule of law, one that will come into effect if and
only if the President makes some future determination, is unconstitu-
tional. For any such statute would do just what you object to in the
Line Item Veto Act: it would empower the President to prevent a
portion of a bill he has signed from taking real legal effect in the real
world. So any such statute would also violate Section 7?
No-Longer-So-Confident: Yes, I guess that follows from what I just
said.
Doubtful: Well, in that event, the Line Item Veto Act is not the only
casualty. Congress passes conditional statutes all the time. Sometimes
Congress declares that certain rules will not come into effect unless
an executive agency takes a certain action; sometimes Congress spe-
cifically gives the President the power to make a determination, on
the basis of which the conditional rules will take effect.25 Are these
statutes unconstitutional, too? And are all the cases that have upheld
these statutes wrongly decided?
No-Longer-So-Confident: Gee, I don’t know. Maybe I was wrong to
say that any statute is unconstitutional if it gives the President power
to prevent portions of a signed bill from becoming the real law of the
land.
Doubtful: I think you were wrong. Or at any rate I think it very un-
likely that the Supreme Court would knowingly invalidate all condi-
25. As the district court stated in Synar v. United States, “[i]n such cases, the Court classi-
fies Congress’s action as legislating in contingency.” 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1387 (D.D.C. 1986)
(three-judge panel), aff’d sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). The district court in
Synar cited numerous cases supporting this practice. See Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1387 (citing
United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939) (upholding the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, which delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture the power
to exempt cooperatives from payment of a uniform price to producers of milk); Currin v. Wal-
lace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1939) (upholding the Tobacco Inspection Act which delegated to the
Secretary of Agriculture the power to designate tobacco markets for government inspection
and grading); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892) (holding that Congress had the power to
delegate to the President the ability to indefinitely suspend free importation laws against coun-
tries which he “deem[ed]” to be unfairly and unequally dealing with the United States); The
Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1812) (holding that
Congress can delegate to the President the power to declare by proclamation that a contin-
gency, upon which the revival of an act is dependent, has occurred)).
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tional statutes, and knowingly reverse all the cases that have previ-
ously upheld them, by rejecting the Line Item Veto Act on these
grounds.
No-Longer-So-Confident: But the Line Item Veto Act still seems
very different to me. It is not like the conditional statutes you refer
to. It gives the President power to repeal legislation and to do so
piecemeal. It allows him to revise the entire legislative bargain that
Congress struck. That’s what bothers me about it.
Doubtful: Good. That’s an excellent point. Unfortunately, you have
now utterly changed your position.
No-Longer-So-Confident: Can I come back with a new name?
Doubtful: No, your name still suits. Just observe that we are, in large
measure, about to leave the terrain covered by Chadha. Perhaps we
could put it as follows: Chadha concerned the Article I process of
lawmaking. The Line Item Veto Act raises issues of law unmaking.
The true constitutional question raised by the Act is under what con-
ditions, if any, may Congress vest the President with the power to
unmake law that has already been made? The first thing to recognize
about this question is that the Constitution does not provide any ex-
plicit or formulaic answers to it.
No-Longer-So-Confident: Well, I don’t know that your way of put-
ting it is helpful. Aren’t you forgetting that Chadha involved a veto,
too? So wasn’t Chadha about law unmaking after all?
Doubtful: I don’t think so.
No-Longer-So-Confident: You don’t? How could Chadha involve a
veto and not be a case about law unmaking?
Doubtful: Because the veto at issue in Chadha was a legislative veto.
No-Longer-So-Confident: I don’t understand.
Doubtful: I don’t blame you. Let me try to explain. A legislative veto
is an attempt by Congress to reverse the decisions of executive
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branch (or conceivably even judicial) officers regarding the interpre-
tation or implementation of law, not to change the law they are im-
plementing. There are excellent reasons why Congress should not be
permitted to give itself a supervisory role in the execution or adjudi-
cation of laws.
No-Longer-So-Confident:  But Chadha held that a legislative veto is
unconstitutional because it is legislative in nature and therefore has
to comply with the Section 7 process. You seem to be saying that a
legislative veto is unconstitutional because it is executive or judicial in
nature. Are you saying that Chadha was rightly decided but for the
wrong reasons?
Doubtful: Let me make a confession. I am of two minds about
whether legislative vetoes really are unconstitutional. And I mean
that literally.
No-Longer-So-Confident:  Literally of two minds?
Doubtful: Yes. This is a coauthored work. But I am not calling
Chadha into question here, and nothing in my argument turns on a
suggestion that Chadha was wrongly decided or even wrongly rea-
soned. I am saying that, under the Constitution and under Chadha,
Congress can intervene in the administration or interpretation of
laws only if it proceeds by way of Section 7.26 If Congress wants to re-
peal an administrative regulation, it can certainly do so. If Congress
wants to mandate a new interpretation of an old statute, it can do
that, too. But it must do so directly—not by turning itself into a su-
pervisory executive or judicial body. It must do so through Section 7.
Congress can involve itself in the interpretation and implementation
of law only as a legislature, and therefore a congressional “veto” can-
not be constitutional unless it conforms with Section 7. But that is
precisely why the Line Item Veto Act raises no Chadha problem.
Chadha makes clear that Congress could not give itself power to re-
scind any provisions of enacted legislation outside of the Section 7
process. But that is because Congress must act only through the Sec-
tion 7 process. The question is whether the Act is unconstitutional
because it gives the President a power to unmake law outside the Sec-
26. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 950.
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tion 7 process—a power that Congress, under Chadha, clearly could
not give itself.
No-Longer-So-Confident: I think I should thank you again. Surely
you’ve put your finger on the problem now. How could Congress give
the President a law unmaking power that it does not possess itself?
Doubtful: You have a point. It would seem logically impossible for a
legislative body to delegate power that it does not itself possess. But
the fact is that every congressional delegation of rulemaking author-
ity to an administrative agency does the same thing: it empowers the
administrative agency to promulgate rules of law outside the Section
7 process, which Congress itself could not do. I’m afraid that if we are
to keep the administrative state intact, we have to say that Section 7
is not a limit on the legislative powers that Congress can delegate, but
only a limit on the process through which Congress can delegate
those powers. Do you see what I mean?
No-Longer-So-Confident: Not exactly.
Doubtful: It’s really not complicated. Section 7 applies only to con-
gressional lawmaking. When Congress delegates to officers of the
other two branches any of its powers to make or to unmake rules of
law, those officers may exercise such delegated powers without going
through the Section 7 process. After all, that’s what executive branch
officers do every day, when they exercise their delegated powers to
interpret and implement statutory schemes.
No-Longer-So-Confident: That seems indisputable.
Doubtful: I think so. So we have answered your question about how
Congress could vest the President with the power to rescind unilater-
ally law outside the Section 7 process even though Congress could
not exercise such a power itself. Which means we can finally return to
your more important objection.
No-Longer-So-Confident: Okay. What was it again?
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Doubtful: Your objection was that the Line Item Veto Act authorizes
the President to repeal legislation piecemeal and thereby to revise
the entire legislative bargain struck by Congress.
No-Longer-So-Confident: That’s right. That’s why the Act is uncon-
stitutional.
II. REVISING THE LEGISLATIVE BARGAIN
Doubtful: Once again, you must permit me to go slowly here. Let me
take your objection point by point. Are you saying that Congress may
never vest the President with the power to rescind portions of duly
enacted law?
No-Longer-So-Confident:  Maybe I am. Delegation doctrine may be
incredibly broad, but I’m tempted to say that the one thing delega-
tion doctrine cannot permit is delegating to an executive officer the
power to simply negate congressionally enacted policy. “Never be-
fore,” as the district court said in Raines, has a congressional delega-
tion “gone so far as to transfer [to an executive officer] the function
of repealing a provision of statutory law.”27 How can it even be called
“executing the law” if the executive simply says no when presented
with a congressional directive?28 Is there some reason why I cannot
take this position?
Doubtful: There is indeed, if you count the practice of the nation for
almost two centuries as a reason. The Raines court was simply wrong
on this point. For example, in 1809, Congress passed a statute allow-
ing the President to suspend commercial non-intercourse laws (an
embargo, essentially) upon a determination by him that those laws
would no longer serve certain national interests. In a case called The
Orono,29 no less a figure than Justice Joseph Story treated the Presi-
dent’s power to revoke the embargo provisions as entirely uncontro-
versial.30 Since then, Congress has repeatedly given the President the
27. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25, 36 (D.D.C. 1997).
28. See Lessig, supra note 6, at 1661-63 (stating that provisions which allow the President
to negate congressional directives fail the non-delegation doctrine just as affirmative executive
actions do).
29. 18 F. Cas. 830 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 10,585).
30. The question in The Orono was whether the federal government had the lawful
authority to seize a schooner for violating an embargo act. Id. at 830. Under the Noninter-
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power to terminate provisions of statutory law.31 The only limitation
added here by modern doctrine is that Congress must have suffi-
ciently limited the President’s discretion so as to meet the
“intelligibility” requirements of the non-delegation doctrine,32 but as
the Raines district court correctly noted, that isn’t difficult to do.33
As to your claim that revoking a law cannot logically be re-
garded as executing the law, the answer is that if law A expressly
authorizes the President to revoke law B, a President who exercises
this revocation power may not be executing law B, but he is certainly
executing law A. Indeed, in Bowsher v. Synar34—the balanced-budget
course Act of March 1, 1809, ch. 24, § 11, 2 Stat. 530, 531, the President was authorized to
“suspend” the embargo with respect to Great Britain if Britain abolished certain of its laws per-
taining to United States ships. Informed that Britain had revoked its offending Orders in Coun-
cil, President Madison exercised his authority under the Act to issue a proclamation stating that
fact and thereby authorizing the resumption of trade with British ports. Madison subsequently
learned that his information was erroneous, and he issued a second proclamation that at-
tempted to revive the embargo he had mistakenly suspended. Justice Story rejected the gov-
ernment’s argument that this second proclamation had reinstated the trade ban. The Act dele-
gated to the President only the power to suspend the embargo; once the President exercised
that power, the suspension was necessarily permanent unless Congress itself should pass further
legislation. See The Orono, 18 F. Cas. at 830 (discussing the scope of presidential authority un-
der the Nonintercourse Act and the Act of June 28, 1809, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 550). The Act, wrote
Justice Story, “contains no authority whatsoever to enable the president to revive that act,
when once it had been suspended, as to either nation. The authority given is exclusively con-
fined to the revocation of the act.” Id.
31. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 224 (authorizing repeal of certain duty laws
with “such repeal to take effect in favour of any foreign nation, whenever the President” de-
termines that that nation has abolished its duties); Act of May 31, 1830, ch. 219, § 2, 4 Stat. 425,
425 (providing that preexisting statutes imposing duties on a foreign nation’s vessels “shall be
repealed” when “the President determined that that nation had abolished its duties”); Act of
Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612 (authorizing the President to “suspend” provisions
on certain conditions); Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
509, § 529, 104 Stat. 1427, 1430, 1436 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5303(b)(1), 5304a(a) (1994))
(authorizing the President to replace the statutory formula for federal employee pay increases
with a formula chosen by the President); Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983,
Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1127(a), 96 Stat. 718, 758 (1982) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §
7309(b) (1994)) (authorizing the President to make exceptions to a ban on foreign construction
of military vessels). The Supreme Court discussed and approved the practice—even then a
long-standing one—of congressional authorization of the President to “repeal” statutory provi-
sions in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 685-87 (1892).
32. The non-delegation doctrine requires “that delegated power include at least roughly
intelligible ‘standards’ to guide the delegated party.” TRIBE, supra note 9, at 364.
33. See Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25, 36 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing cases and concluding that
a delegation is constitutional as long as “Congress itself articulated ‘intelligible principles’ by
which delegated authority is to be exercised”); see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,
771 (1996) (“we have since [1935] upheld, without exception, delegations under standards
phrased in sweeping terms”).
34. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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case—the Court expressly held that Congress had vested the Comp-
troller General with executive powers when it authorized him to
make cuts in appropriations previously enacted.35 So long as Congress
has explicitly authorized an executive officer to unmake certain laws,
and so long as Congress has provided the officer with an “intelligible
principle” to guide the exercise of this power, the executive officer
will stand as solidly within the confines of delegation doctrine as he
does when Congress authorizes him to make law.36
No-Longer-So-Confident: Wait a minute. You said the President had
been given the power to “suspend” the law in the statute as issue in
The Orono. Isn’t that different from a power to permanently rescind?
Doubtful: Good question, but the answer is no. In fact, in The Orono,
Justice Story stated that when Congress delegates to the President
the authority to “suspend” the operation of a statutory provision, the
suspension is necessarily permanent unless Congress has provided
some express means through which the President may revive the sus-
pended provision.37 The power to “revive” a statutory provision stood
for Story on exactly the same basis as the power to suspend one; the
President’s “authority for this purpose must be derived from some
positive law.”38 For Justice Story, the President’s suspension power
had to be given the same legal effect as a repeal, because “[t]he
authority given is exclusively confined to the revocation of the act.”39
And in a number of later statutes, Congress expressly authorized the
President to “repeal” statutory provisions.40
No-Longer-So-Confident: I still don’t quite see the point of your ar-
gument.
Doubtful: Let me try to show you. Would there be anything constitu-
tionally troubling about a statute that provided the following?:
35. See id. at 733.
36. See id. at 720.
37. See The Orono, 18 F. Cas. 830, 830 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 10,585).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 31.
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In prescribed circumstances, the President may suspend provision X
for a time, and at the end of the period, X automatically comes back
into effect.
No-Longer-So-Confident: Of course not. Congress is simply defining
how long the suspension it authorizes should be.
Doubtful: I agree. Let me run a couple of variations past you. What
do you think about this?:
In prescribed circumstances, the President may suspend provision X
for a time, and may renew the suspension repeatedly, indeed indefi-
nitely. X comes into effect automatically at the end of the period if
the President does not suspend it again.
No-Longer-So-Confident: I don’t see why permitting the President in
effect to extend the suspension period makes any difference constitu-
tionally.
Doubtful: Neither do I. And what about this last hypothetical?:
In prescribed circumstances, the President may suspend provision X,
with indefinite effect; the President may subsequently revoke the
suspension and allow X to come into effect.
No-Longer-So-Confident: Look, I can see as well as you that your
last two examples might result in the provisions being unenforced in-
definitely: the President could keep renewing the suspension or de-
cline to revoke the suspension, as the case may be. But neither stat-
ute would actually permit the President to undo the provision.
Doubtful: I think you’ve already surrendered the distinction you
wanted to maintain. You agree, apparently, that Congress is free ei-
ther to determine for itself the exact time period that a suspension
shall last, or to permit the President the discretion to make the sus-
pension permanent in effect. The Line Item Veto Act simply exer-
cises the power to determine an exact time period and in doing so
gives the executive less discretion than he would be given in my last
two examples. Surely it would be odd to conclude that the problem
with the Act is that it too tightly constrains the power it delegates to
the President.41
41. But isn’t that exactly what Rappaport does? See Rappaport, supra note 6, at 772; see
also supra notes 16-18 (discussing Rappaport’s “veto burden” argument).
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No-Longer-So-Confident: But there is a distinction between all the
statutes to which you refer and the Line Item Veto Act. Those stat-
utes authorized the President to cancel their own provisions.42 By con-
trast, when the President cancels a provision under the Line Item
Veto Act, he exercises power with respect to the provisions of a dif-
ferent law.
Doubtful: Actually, some of the statutes I referred to gave the Presi-
dent cancellation power over the provisions of another statute.43 But
why is that relevant?
No-Longer-So-Confident: For the very reason I’ve already given: by
allowing the President to cancel out items from a different law, the
Line Item Veto Act permits the President to upset the bargain the
lawmaking process reached in shaping that other statute. In other
words, the Act permits the President to change the bargain that Con-
gress reached in the later bill and that the President accepted when
he signed the bill into law.
Doubtful: Good. We arrive, then, at your more important objection. I
have heard this objection often, but the truth is that I have difficulty
making sense of it. Does “changing the legislative bargain” mean
doing something with the law such that some of those congressmen
who voted for the bill would not have voted for it?
No-Longer-So-Confident: In the case of the Line Item Veto Act, the
President may change the law so much that a majority of congress-
men might no longer have voted for it.
Doubtful: Perhaps. But when an administrative agency enacts a new
regulation, don’t you suppose it likely that some of the congressmen
who voted for the underlying law might not have voted for it had they
known it would be so interpreted? Indeed, do you suppose an agency
42. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 7309(b) (1994) (authorizing the President to waive the ban on
foreign construction of military vessels—a ban established within the same statute—when he
unilaterally “determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States”).
43. See, e.g., Act of May 31, 1830, ch. 219, § 3, 3 Stat. 224 (granting the President the
authority to repeal previously enacted duty laws).
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never interprets a statute in a fashion such that a majority of Con-
gress might have voted against the statute, so interpreted?
No-Longer-So-Confident: I suppose that that may sometimes occur.
But in such a case, I would say that the agency transgressed congres-
sional intent and that its regulation is therefore invalid.
Doubtful: Would you say so? And if Congress had specifically and
intentionally vested the agency with broad discretion, knowing in ad-
vance that the agency might pass the interpretation it did, would you
still say so?
No-Longer-So-Confident: Well, in that case part of the congressional
bargain would have been accepting the risk that the agency might act
in the way that it did.
Doubtful: That’s just what I think. But then you must agree that the
President’s cancellation power under the Line Item Veto Act does
not “change the legislative bargain” either. The Act does not inter-
fere with Congress’s ability, when passing a future bill, to forbid
presidential cancellation of any or all provisions in that bill. If Con-
gress sends the President a taxing and spending bill with provisions
subject to the line item veto and doesn’t exercise the power to pre-
vent cancellation, it does so knowing that the President may cancel
those provisions. Part of the bargain reached through the lawmaking
process in such a case was a decision not to prevent the President
from exercising the line item veto authority.
No-Longer-So-Confident: But suppose Congress passes a bill calling
for equal foreign aid dollars to Israel and Egypt. The whole point of
the package is that Congress is dealing equally with both countries.
Let’s say that the President signs this bill into law and then cancels
out the aid to Egypt. He has totally undone the legislative bargain
and has totally altered the underlying policy that went with it. Con-
gress can’t restore its policy choice without mustering a two-thirds
vote for it. That’s radically different from what any regulatory
agency, implementing a congressionally enacted policy, has ever been
or would ever be empowered to do. The clause of the Act permitting
future Congresses to shelter tax provisions from the President’s line
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item veto44 would be completely unavailing, because my Israel-Egypt
law involves spending items, not tax items.
Doubtful: I think you may be misunderstanding how the Line Item
Veto Act works. Do you or don’t you agree that in the case of the
statute you just hypothesized, Congress could, by simply saying so in
the bill presented to the President, and by simple majority vote, pre-
vent the President from applying his line item power to the foreign
aid grants?
No-Longer-So-Confident: I thought Congress could only shelter tax
provisions.
Doubtful: On the contrary. Any time Congress wants to couple two
spending provisions together, or, for that matter, to make any provi-
sion of any bill not subject to the Line Item Veto, it may do so—by
simple majority vote. The reason is that a new bill must be signed
into law by the President before the Line Item Veto Act can apply to
it, and if the new bill, just signed into law, modifies the President’s
cancellation power, the new law supersedes the old and is binding. If
the President is presented with a bill to which the Line Item Veto Act
applies, it is because Congress has, by majority rule, decided to send
him that bill, with full knowledge and willingness that the line item
power may be exercised.
No-Longer-So-Confident: But the Act puts the onus on Congress to
take affirmative steps in order to avoid the Act’s applicability in the
future.
Doubtful: I don’t see why that makes a difference. All sorts of stat-
utes require Congress to take specific steps in subsequent legislation
if it doesn’t wish later statutes to be administered in accordance with
the earlier. That, indeed, is the very point of “framework statutes.”45
44. See 2 U.S.C. § 691f (Supp. II 1996).
45. Framework statutes, in this sense, do not simply formulate particular policies but cre-
ate “a more detailed framework for governmental decisionmaking” by imposing broad con-
gressional requirements across a broad range of specific statutes and policies. Gerhard Casper,
The Constitutional Organization of the Government, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177, 187 (1985).
The Line Item Veto Act is itself codified as an addition to a framework statute, the Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (limiting and regulating executive power to de-
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More generally, think about the effect of the well-established rule
that later statutes are not to be interpreted as repealing earlier law
unless Congress has made the repeal explicit. Congress doesn’t vio-
late the Constitution by passing legislation that has a practical effect
on how it can later accomplish other goals.
III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
No-Longer-So-Confident: I’m not satisfied. I still think that the Line
Item Veto Act gives the President the power to rewrite legislation.
Even if there’s some precedent for this sort of thing, the Act goes
much further than prior statutes. As the district judge in City of New
York put it, while “[t]he line between permissible delegations of
rulemaking authority and impermissible abandonments of lawmaking
power is a thin one,” the Line Item Veto Act “impermissibly crosses
the line [by] surrender[ing] to the President . . . an inherently legisla-
tive function, namely, the authority to pick and choose among por-
tions of an enacted law to determine which ones will remain valid.”46
That’s lawmaking, and it violates the general principle of separation
of powers to give such lawmaking power to the President.
Doubtful: Excellent. The separation of powers is an excellent objec-
tion. But your conclusion is too quick for me. There’s an old case that
suggests that John Marshall and his colleagues didn’t accept your line
of thought. In The Brig Aurora v. United States,47 the argument was
made that Congress cannot authorize the President to determine
whether an earlier, expired statute’s provisions should be partially
revived because doing so would be “transfer[ring] the legislative
cline to spend appropriated funds). Other examples of framework statutes include the National
Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-472, 90 Stat. 1255 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 50 U.S.C.) (including a provision, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1621(b)(2), which states that no
statute passed after 1976 supersedes provisions of the Act unless it does so in “specific terms”),
and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (imposing various requirements across a broad
range of federal activities and applying those requirements to later-enacted programs). Con-
gress not infrequently exercises its power to prevent the application of framework statute re-
quirements, but of course it must take affirmative steps to do so as long as the framework stat-
ute remains in place. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-106, § 2833, 110 Stat. 186, 559 (partially exempting certain programs from the re-
quirements of the National Environmental Policy Act).
46. City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 180-81 (D.D.C. 1998).
47. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
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power to the President” by giving his action “the force of a law.”48
The Supreme Court made quick work of this reasoning: “[W]e can
see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its
discretion in reviving the [expired] act . . . either expressly or condi-
tionally, as their judgment should direct.”49 If Congress has the consti-
tutional discretion to grant the President the power to decide, in ac-
cordance with conditions Congress has prescribed, that a particular
provision of law should go into effect, it is hard to see why Congress
doesn’t have the discretion to grant the President the power to de-
cide, in accordance with conditions Congress has prescribed, that a
particular provision of law should not go into effect.
No-Longer-So-Confident: Sorry, but The Brig Aurora leaves me
unimpressed. First, it’s a very old case; separation of powers doctrine
has evolved a lot since then. More importantly, the situation there
was just not comparable to the kind of presidential legislation in-
volved in the Line Item Veto Act. Allowing the President to revive
an embargo in matters directly pertaining to foreign policy is not re-
motely analogous to allowing the President to pick and choose, out of
every single omnibus appropriations bill, which spending items will or
will not be the law of the land. You don’t want to confront it, but the
Line Item Veto Act basically turns the President into a superdrafts-
man, blue-penciling the budget and tax laws of the nation in accor-
dance with his, not Congress’s, policy choices.
Doubtful: All right, then let’s return to a much more recent case very
much on point: Bowsher v. Synar.50 Remember that Bowsher also in-
volved a statute which vested a supervisory budget-cutting authority
in an officer whose decisions were to have been implemented directly
by the executive branch. Indeed, the Balanced Budget Act of 198551
went considerably farther than does the Line Item Veto Act in cre-
ating what you call a super-legislator outside Congress: the Comp-
48. Id. at 386 (1813) (argument of counsel). The issue in The Brig Aurora concerned the
successor embargo act to the one Justice Story considered in The Orono, 18 F. Cas. 830 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1812). The later act authorized the President to revive the (expired) provisions of the
earlier trade ban against either Britain or France if the other country recognized American
claims about neutral shipping. The lawfulness of the Aurora’s seizure depended on the legal
effect of the President’s action.
49. The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 388.
50. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
51. 2 U.S.C. §  901 et seq. (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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troller General was empowered to go through the entire federal
budget, program by program, and make cuts in every single one of
them as he saw fit.52 Even so, the Bowsher Court did not hold that
vesting such power in an executive officer was unconstitutional as
such. On the contrary, the Court held that the Comptroller General
could not constitutionally exercise this power because the Comptrol-
ler General was not executive enough (he was subject to discharge by
Congress and was thus found to be an agent of the legislative
branch).53 Bowsher almost conclusively stands for the proposition that
a statute delegating discretionary budget-cutting authority delegates
executive powers.
No-Longer-So-Confident: As I recall Bowsher, wasn’t the Comp-
troller General basically a ministerial officer, required to make pre-
scribed budget cuts without exercising any policymaking judgment of
his own?
Doubtful: Another good question, but the Bowsher Court did not
think so and made a contrary finding part of the holding of the case.
The Court rejected the claim that the Comptroller General’s duties
under the Act were “essentially ministerial.”54 The Court expressly
found that the “Comptroller General must exercise judgment” and
“interpret the provisions of the Act,” and that he had “the ultimate
authority to determine the budget cuts to be made.”55 Indeed, the
Bowsher Court stated that this discretionary aspect of the Comptrol-
ler General’s duties was part of what made those duties executive, so
that the Comptroller General ought not to have been removable by
Congress.56 Given Bowsher, I really don’t think you can object to the
Line Item Veto Act on the ground that it vests in the executive
branch a power to make selective budget-cutting decisions—or, as
you put it, to “pick and choose among portions” of an appropriations
law “and determine which ones will remain valid.”
52. See id. at 717, 731 (describing the Comptroller General’s powers under the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985).
53. See id. at 727-32.
54. Id. at 733-34.
55. Id. at 732-33.
56. See id. at 733.
POWELL FINAL.DOC 10/29/98 4:27 PM
1998] LAYING IT ON THE LINE 1199
No-Longer-So-Confident: I think you’re doing something tricky with
Bowsher. To begin with, the Bowsher Court didn’t expressly say that
the Balanced Budget Act would have been constitutional if the
Comptroller General had not been removable by Congress.
Doubtful: True, but none of the Court’s reasoning is dictum either.
The finding that the Comptroller General had been vested with ex-
ecutive power was essential to the holding of the case. And that
finding pretty much negates any claim that the Line Item Veto Act
vests the President with “legislative” powers, don’t you think?
No-Longer-So-Confident: No, I don’t think so.
Doubtful: Why not?
No-Longer-So-Confident: Well, I’m embarrassed to say.
Doubtful: Don’t be silly.
No-Longer-So-Confident: I think I’m getting confused about the
whole doctrine of separation of powers.
Doubtful: You’re in good company. Can you tell me what it is that’s
confusing?
No-Longer-So-Confident: Didn’t Bowsher also hold that if Congress
itself had done exactly the same program-by-program budget cutting
that it asked the Comptroller General to do, Congress would have
been acting legislatively?
Doubtful: Yes, in effect.
No-Longer-So-Confident: Well, how can it be that an action is
“executive” if performed by the Comptroller General, but
“legislative” if performed by Congress?
Doubtful: You are asking a deep and dark question. Do we really
have to enter into that cave?
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No-Longer-So-Confident: I think we do. One thing we know for sure
is that the Constitution “refutes the idea that [the President] is to be
a lawmaker.”57 Despite Bowsher, I just don’t see how we can keep the
President from being a lawmaker if we allow the President to exercise
program-by-program rewriting of congressional policy—the kind of
rewriting that would clearly be “legislative,” under Chadha and even
Bowsher, if Congress itself sought to do it.
Doubtful: Would it help if I told you that the Court’s more recent
separation of powers cases, such as Morrison58 and even more clearly
Mistretta,59 have largely repudiated the attempt to decide which pow-
ers are purely executive or essentially legislative? Although earlier
cases pursued this taxonomic approach, the problem was always that
the analysis seemed to change depending on which officer was taking
the action at issue. You just pointed this out with respect to Bowsher,
but it was equally true in Chadha, where the Court said that Con-
gress’s decision about whether a person did or did not fall within the
category “deportable alien” was legislative in character, but that the
Attorney General’s virtually identical decision was executive in char-
acter.60 In the more recent cases, the Court has stopped trying to clas-
sify particular powers as uniquely executive, legislative, or judicial.
The point is not to achieve a “hermetic division between the
Branches,”61 but to ensure that no one branch achieves too much
unilateral power.62 I think the Line Item Veto Act fits comfortably
into the new regime. Does that solve your problem?
No-Longer-So-Confident: No.
Doubtful: I didn’t think it would. But tell me why not.
No-Longer-So-Confident: Because I know all about the old debate
between “formalism” and “functionalism” in separation of powers
57. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
58. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of the Ethics in
Government Act).
59. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the
United States Sentencing Commission).
60. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983).
61. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382.
62. See id.
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doctrine,63 and I don’t accept Morrison and Mistretta as wholesale re-
pudiations of the old “formalist” cases. For one thing, Metropolitan
Washington Airport Authority,64 decided after those cases, is just as
formalist as any of the older cases.65 And for another, I think the for-
malist cases may have been right.
Doubtful: You leave us no choice, then. You seem insistent that we
enter into the debate between formalism and functionalism in separa-
tion of powers doctrine.
No-Longer-So-Confident: I think we have to. The Line Item Veto
Act, for all practical purposes, gives the President substantial law-
making power. Its hard to believe that that could be constitutionally
acceptable. I want to know how that result is constitutionally accept-
able. This is the kind of case that requires us to go back to first prin-
ciples.
Doubtful: Are you prepared to conclude that the entire administra-
tive state is unconstitutional?
No-Longer-So-Confident: No. I didn’t mean to go back that far into
first principles.
Doubtful: Good. But perhaps we had better say that the constitution-
ality by and large of the administrative state will be one of our first
principles.
No-Longer-So-Confident: Okay.
Doubtful: Perhaps it will also be helpful to clarify the debate we are
trying to resolve. I will understand the so-called “formalist” position
63. For commentary in and on this debate, see Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and
the Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 GEO. WASH. L.J. 668 (1990);
Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of
the Separation of Powers, 1987 BYU L. REV. 719; Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel
Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988); Lee S. Lieberman, Morrison v. Olsen: A Formalistic Per-
spective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (1989).
64. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
65. See id. at 274-77 (holding, on separation of powers grounds, that it would be unconsti-
tutional for members of Congress to serve on the Airport Authority’s review board).
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to hold that the correct approach to separation of powers cases is for
a court to look at the governmental action at issue, to decide whether
that governmental action is legislative, executive or judicial in nature,
and then to make sure that only legislators are performing legislative
actions, only executive officers are performing executive actions, and
so on. Is that fair?
No-Longer-So-Confident: I think so.
Doubtful: And I will understand the “functionalist” position to hold
that the proper approach is not to make these conceptual determina-
tions, but rather to favor overlapping, concurrent jurisdictions among
the branches and to ensure that no one branch is vested with too
much unilateral power. All right?
No-Longer-So-Confident: All right.
Doubtful: So that we might call formalism a separation of powers ap-
proach and functionalism a checks and balances approach. Do you
follow me?
No-Longer-So-Confident: Yes, and that’s why I’ve always preferred
formalism. Call me old-fashioned, but I think there should be a sepa-
ration of powers approach to separation of powers cases.
Doubtful: Perhaps so, but what if I now said that the administrative
state effectively puts an end to the whole debate between formalism
and functionalism in the area of separation of powers? What if I said
that you can’t be a separation of powers formalist and accept the con-
stitutionality of executive officers performing legislative functions?
No-Longer-So-Confident: I wouldn’t be happy with that conclusion
at all. There are a lot of formalist cases out there, and I’m not pre-
pared to accept that it follows as a logical matter from the adminis-
trative state that they were all wrongly decided. Chadha held that
legislative vetoes were unconstitutional because they were legislative
in nature and therefore had to comply with Section 7.66 Bowsher held
that Congress could not retain a removal power over officers exer-
66. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 (1983).
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cising executive functions.67 Youngstown held that the President could
not unilaterally order his subordinates to take over American steel
mills because his doing so was essentially presidential lawmaking.68
Metropolitan Washington held that Members of Congress cannot ex-
ercise executive powers.69 I told you before: I think these cases may
have been rightly decided, and I can’t believe that the constitutional-
ity of the administrative state somehow dictates a contrary result.
Doubtful: Know what? I think they may have been rightly decided
too.
No-Longer-So-Confident: You do?
Doubtful: I really do.
No-Longer-So-Confident: Well, then, don’t go defending the Line
Item Veto Act by invoking Morrison and Mistretta. If you accept the
formalist cases, you have to admit that the Act vests in the President
an essentially legislative function.
Doubtful: On the contrary. Didn’t we see only a moment ago that the
Court in Bowsher held—as a formalist matter—that the power to ex-
ercise budget-cutting discretion over the entire range of federal
spending programs was an executive function?
No-Longer-So-Confident: Damnation. That’s where I got confused in
the first place. How can that function be executive when we know
that if Congress performed the very same function, it would be legis-
lative? I mean, if we accept the formalist cases, how can a given gov-
ernmental action be legislative when Congress performs it, but execu-
tive when the executive performs it? And if we can’t solve that
problem, why isn’t the administrative state unconstitutional after all?
Now I’m totally perplexed again.
67. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986).
68. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952).
69. See Metropolitan Washington, 501 U.S. at 277.
POWELL FINAL.DOC 10/29/98 4:27 PM
1204 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:1171
Doubtful: I may have an answer to all your riddles. But I have to tell
you in advance that I can’t agree with you about dismissing Morrison
and Mistretta. I think they may have been rightly decided too.
No-Longer-So-Confident: But you can’t. Unless you mean they were
rightly decided but wrongly reasoned at a deep level. Is that what you
mean?
Doubtful: No. I mean that I accept the checks and balances approach
to separation of powers questions. And I do so in part because oth-
erwise the administrative state would indeed be unconstitutional.
No-Longer-So-Confident: But you said you thought the formalist
cases might have been rightly decided too. I don’t understand.
Doubtful: Everyone seems to think that “formalism” and
“functionalism,” or the separation of powers and checks and balances
approaches, are mutually exclusive. I don’t.
No-Longer-So-Confident: But they are mutually exclusive. If you
took a rigorous separation of powers approach to Mistretta, the case
would have come out the other way, wouldn’t it?
Doubtful: I imagine so.
No-Longer-So-Confident: But you think Mistretta was rightly de-
cided?
Doubtful: I do.
No-Longer-So-Confident: But that means you reject the formalist,
separation of powers approach.
Doubtful: Definitely not.
No-Longer-So-Confident: This is maddening.
Doubtful: Sometimes the light can be maddening if a person has
spent his life in a cave.
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No-Longer-So-Confident: Oh, put up or shut up.
Doubtful: Sorry. Here’s the key to the riddle. I believe in the formal-
ist separation of powers approach to separation of powers cases when
Members of Congress are the governmental actors whose reaching or
overreaching is in question.
No-Longer-So-Confident: What? I’ve never heard of such a thing.
Doubtful: I understand that, but it entirely solves all the difficulties at
once. Look at the great formalist cases. In Chadha, as you noted,
Members of Congress were trying to decide whether an individual
alien was deportable under established law.70 In Bowsher, a congres-
sional removal power was at stake.71 In Metropolitan Washington, it
was Members of Congress again, trying to sit on an airport authority
board.72 The same point can be about other formalist cases, too.73
Congressmen cannot exercise executive or judicial powers, but execu-
tive and judicial officers may exercise legislative powers. Hence the
administrative state is perfectly constitutional, but courts must con-
tinue to exercise formalist separation of powers vigilance whenever
Congress tries to give its own Members any powers outside the Arti-
cle I, Section 7 lawmaking process.
No-Longer-So-Confident: But what possible basis is there for draw-
ing such a distinction between Congressmen and the officials of other
branches?
Doubtful: The best possible basis: the command of the Constitution.
In Article I, Section 6, the Constitution expressly provides that no
Member of Congress may serve as an Officer of the United States.74
And in Article II, Section 2, the Constitution excludes Congress from
70. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953.
71. See Synar, 478 U.S. at 732-34.
72. See Metropolitan Washington, 501 U.S. at 277.
73. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that the Appointments Clause
forbids Congress from appointing executive officers); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926) (invalidating a statutory provision conditioning the President’s power to remove an ex-
ecutive officer on the consent of the Senate).
74. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“no Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office”).
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appointing Officers of the United States.75 An “Officer of the United
States” is a federal official exercising any significant executive or ju-
dicial powers.76 It follows that Members of Congress cannot exercise
such powers; nor can they appoint themselves to do so. There is an
excellent reason why the Constitution should prevent Members of
Congress from serving as officers. The reason comes back to checks
and balances.
When an executive or judicial officer exercises legislative power,
he can do so only through an authority delegated by Congress and
with monies appropriated by Congress. Moreover, when executive
officers perform lawmaking functions in administrative agencies, they
act not only within confines set forth by Congress, but subject to re-
view by the judiciary.77 But if Members of Congress were able to give
themselves the power to execute, interpret, or adjudicate their own
laws, then Congress would have no check on its powers at all. The
administrative state is full of checks and balances guarding against an
accumulation of excessive unilateral power in the President. But
without the distinction on which I insist and which Article I, Section 6
polices, Congress could arrogate to itself unilateral power.
The Constitution erects no similar bar against executive or judi-
cial officers. Of course they cannot serve as Members of Congress,
but there is no bar against an executive officer holding a judicial of-
fice (remember Chief Justice Marshall) or performing lawmaking du-
ties if such duties have been duly delegated to the officer by Con-
gress.
I think that with this rule in mind, you should be able to solve all
your perplexities about modern separation of powers doctrine.
75. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
76. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125-26. Officials of other governments sometimes may exer-
cise authority under the laws of the United States—think of state officials administering
“cooperative federalism” programs and the like—but their actions in doing so do not implicate
federal separation of powers concerns and they appropriately are not subject to the require-
ment of appointment in accordance with Article II. See The Constitutional Separation of Pow-
ers Between The President and Congress, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 26-27 (May 7, 1996).
77. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983).
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No-Longer-So-Confident: I still have at least one. You neglected to
mention Youngstown. 78 In Youngstown, it was the President—not the
Congress—whose actions were at issue, and the opinion of the Court
concluded that the President had violated the Constitution by acting
legislatively. 79
Doubtful: Which is why the official opinion of the Court in Young-
stown has been so entirely superseded in authority by Justice Jack-
son’s much better reasoned concurrence.80 It’s hard to even make
sense of the idea that the President acted “legislatively” by seizing
the nation’s steel mills. Justice Jackson had it right: the President
acted unconstitutionally in Youngstown because he acted in defiance
of congressional directives, without any sustainable claim in the Con-
stitution that he could act unilaterally in such a matter. Indeed, Jus-
tice Jackson’s opinion in Youngstown, which has been so influential,
may be said to be the very cornerstone of the anti-unilateral-power,
checks and balances approach I have been describing. The Presi-
dent’s steel seizure was unconstitutional not because he acted
“legislatively,” which Presidents may do when so authorized by Con-
gress, but because he had acted in such a way as to circumvent or ig-
nore any possible check from Congress.81
No-Longer-So-Confident: Well, you are too many for me. I can’t ob-
ject to your solution to the separation of powers debate, but I’m not
entirely sure I accept it, either. Can you just tell me how things play
out for the Line Item Veto Act?
Doubtful: Here is how I think things stand. First, if you accept un-
questioningly the formalist cases, your objection to the Act will pri-
marily be that the President has been made into a lawmaker, but this
objection is substantially undermined by Bowsher, a formalist case
holding that the power to go through the federal budget and make
discretionary, program-by-program cuts is executive in nature.82
78. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952).
79. See id. at  588-89 (1952).
80. See id. at 592-655 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 721 (1986) (citing Jackson concurrence).
81. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640.
82. See Synar, 478 U.S. at 733.
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Second, if you accept unquestionably the functionalist cases, or if
you accept my solution to the debate between formalism and func-
tionalism in separation of powers cases, you will not have much of an
objection either, because then the only question will be whether the
Act “disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches”
or whether it “prevents [the affected] Branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned function”83—tests that are not hard to satisfy
and that, I think, the Act quite easily satisfies. Have we come, then,
to the end of our conversation?
No-Longer-So-Confident: No, not yet. I admit that my efforts to
bring the Act down on formalist grounds have not succeeded. But
I’m not prepared to agree with you on your last point. Even if I ac-
cept the checks and balances approach, and the more nebulous stan-
dards from Morrison and Mistretta, I think there is still a case to be
made against the Line Item Veto Act. The Act vests unilateral power
in the President to make budget-cutting decisions. It prevents Con-
gress from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned function of de-
termining the content of federal law.
Doubtful: I don’t agree. Congress’s ability to determine the content
of federal law is entirely unimpaired, including its power to present
the President with a take-it-or-leave-it taxing or spending bill.
Moreover, the Act is fairly tightly circumscribed. The fact that the
President can exercise his line item veto only within the first five days
after signing a bill into law is an important restriction. Otherwise, the
President would have a weapon he could wield against individual
congressmen at any time, by threatening to cancel their favorite
spending measures if they don’t do his bidding. The limited category
of provisions to which the line item power applies is another impor-
tant restriction. And, Congress is perfectly free to forbid the exercise
of the line item veto as to any particular provision, or any particular
bill. True, to do so requires the mustering of enough political will to
enact legislation, but that’s the case any time Congress delegates
power to the executive and doesn’t include an automatic sunset pro-
vision. And anyway, even if you put more weight than I think you
should on the Act’s “imposition” on Congress, it is clear from the
83. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989).
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modern cases that mere interference with the freedom of action of
one of the branches doesn’t violate the separation of powers.84
IV. DRAWING THE LINE AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIGNATURE
No-Longer-So-Confident: But you keep—you’re not—I don’t know
how you did it, but you’ve argued your way to a manifestly unconsti-
tutional conclusion. Look, would you agree that the following would
be unconstitutional?:
Upon being presented with a taxing or spending bill, the President
may, before signing the bill or vetoing it, strike out any provisions of
the sort covered by the Line Item Veto Act, under the procedure set
forth in that Act. The President may then sign into law the bill not
including those provisions that have been struck out.
Doubtful: That certainly sounds like it’s unconstitutional. But that’s
because it would probably violate Section 7, and I thought we fin-
ished with Section 7 a long time ago.
No-Longer-So-Confident: You concede that my pre-signature line
item veto act is unconstitutional?
Doubtful: Yes.
No-Longer-So-Confident: Then it should be obvious to you that the
actual Line Item Veto Act is unconstitutional. The only difference
between my hypothetical and the Act is a matter of a few days.
Doubtful: No, that’s not the only difference. Under your hypothetical
statute, the President is given the power to prevent portions of a
signed bill from ever becoming law, and that consequence—as you
pointed out earlier—would violate the “shall . . . become a Law” lan-
guage of Article I, Section 7.
No-Longer-So-Confident: I thought we rejected formalism!
84. See, e.g., id. at 380-82; Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441-43
(1977) (embracing a “flexible approach” to separation of powers questions and rejecting a re-
quirement of absolute independence).
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Doubtful: On the contrary, I think I’ve told you that I am an Article I
formalist.
No-Longer-So-Confident: But this is formalism without any function.
You admit that my hypothetical statute would be functionally identi-
cal to the actual Line Item Veto Act. What kind of respect is it for
the Constitution’s commands to turn those commands into empty
shells? If the Constitution forbids giving the President a line item
veto before he signs a bill into law, and if the actual Act is function-
ally identical to giving the President such a power, surely the Act
must be unconstitutional too.
Doubtful: I didn’t admit that your hypothetical statute and the actual
Act are functionally identical. Consider it carefully. The Line Item
Veto Act does not allow the President to exercise his cancellation
power on a bill until that bill is law. As we have seen, this means that
if Congress wants to depart from the Line Item Veto Act—if it wants
to modify the President’s line item powers or abolish them entirely as
to a particular bill—it can always do so by simple majority vote of
both Houses. The President cannot exercise his line item power until
he has signed the new bill into law. If Congress has provided in the
new bill that the Line Item Veto Act does not apply, or that it applies
only with certain modifications, Congress’s new will is now the law.
The new bill must become law before the Line Item Veto Act comes
into play, and the new law supersedes the old. We’ve already seen the
decisive importance of this aspect of the Line Item Veto Act. Be-
cause the Act operates only after the President has signed a bill, the
Act allows Congress to escape its terms, by simple majority vote, as
to any subsequent legislation.
But if the President is given a pre-signature line item veto, this
result no longer holds. If the President could cancel provisions of a
later bill before the new bill became law, he could ignore any coun-
termanding provisions of the new bill, which would not be law at the
time he applied his blue pencil to them. That is a crucial functional
difference, and it gives powerful support for drawing a constitutional
line between a pre-signature and a post-signature line item veto.
No-Longer-So-Confident: I think there’s a hole in your reasoning.
My hypothetical line item statute could achieve the same result even
if it still gave the President the cancellation power before signing the
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bill into law. Just imagine that my hypothetical line item statute goes
on to provide that it shall not apply to any bill that says that the line
item power shall not apply to it. Now the two situations are identical
again.
Doubtful: No, they’re not. Unfortunately, your hypothetical statute
could not include the provision you just tried to add to it. For your
new pre-signature line item act would in effect give binding force to
what Congress says in a new bill, before the bill has become law. As
our discussion of Chadha and the separation of powers should have
made clear, such a provision would violate the Constitution. Under
your new hypothetical statute, Congress would in essence have cre-
ated for itself a bicameral legislative veto, a congressional power to
countermand execution of a law in a particular case, merely by pass-
ing a bill not yet signed by the President. A line item statute that gave
the President a pre-signature cancellation power could not have its
application made conditional on Congress’s decision in a subsequent
bill about whether to have it apply.
No-Longer-So-Confident: Can’t I argue that my hypothetical statute
wouldn’t create a legislative veto, but would simply be defining one
of the conditions under which the President could exercise the pre-
signature cancellation power?
Doubtful: You could, but you should lose that argument. No one
thinks that Congress can evade Chadha simply by redefining a legis-
lative veto as an affirmative condition on the executive’s exercise of
authority. That really would make the principle of Chadha formalism
without any function, except as a drafting instruction to Congress
about how to write statutes permitting its Members to exercise pow-
ers outside the bounds of Section 7. The effect of your statute is the
same, regardless of how you characterize it: the two Houses of Con-
gress get to decide, on their own, not to permit the President to exer-
cise a power otherwise available to him. Except for the constitution-
ally unimportant fact that your hypothetical involves action by both
Houses, not just one, its constitutional vice is identical to the problem
in Chadha.
No-Longer-So-Confident: Say, I just had an idea. You don’t suppose
the Line Item Veto Act is constitutional, do you?
